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Title: Destruction as an Incentive Device in Bilateral Contracts
Originating Office: IAS
Speaker: Maskin, Eric
Issue Date: 19-Mar-2010
Event Date: 19-Mar-2010
Group/Series/Folder: Record Group 8.15 - Institute for Advanced Study
Series 3 - Audio-visual Materials
Location: 8.15:3 box 1.5
Notes: Institute for Advanced Study Research Seminars.
Abstract: Prof. Eric Maskin and his research collaborator M. Manea consider four ways of deliberately introducing inefficiencies into bilateral contracts: (1) destroying money; (2) destroying the good traded; (3) destroying value for the buyer; and (4) destroying value for the seller. Of these, they prove that (1)-(3) can never enhance welfare. However, they show that there are circumstances in which (4) leads to welfare improvements.
Duration: 109 min.
Appears in Series:8.15:3 - Audio-visual Materials
Videos for Public -- Distinguished Lectures