Files in This Item:
| File | Format | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| b1112393.mp4 | Streaming Video | View/Open |
| Title: | Destruction as an Incentive Device in Bilateral Contracts |
| Originating Office: | IAS |
| Speaker: | Maskin, Eric |
| Issue Date: | 19-Mar-2010 |
| Event Date: | 19-Mar-2010 |
| Group/Series/Folder: | Record Group 8.15 - Institute for Advanced Study Series 3 - Audio-visual Materials |
| Location: | 8.15:3 box 1.5 |
| Notes: | Institute for Advanced Study Research Seminars. Abstract: Prof. Eric Maskin and his research collaborator M. Manea consider four ways of deliberately introducing inefficiencies into bilateral contracts: (1) destroying money; (2) destroying the good traded; (3) destroying value for the buyer; and (4) destroying value for the seller. Of these, they prove that (1)-(3) can never enhance welfare. However, they show that there are circumstances in which (4) leads to welfare improvements. Duration: 109 min. |
| Appears in Series: | 8.15:3 - Audio-visual Materials Videos for Public -- Distinguished Lectures |